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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

ADONIS ROOER BURCH,

10408

Defendant and Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal prosecution in which Appellant and one Kenneth Dale Hulse were jointly
charged with burglary in the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. The jury returned
a verdict of "guilty". The court sentenced the Appellant to the indeterminate term provided by law for

the offense of burglary in the second degree and de·
nied probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction as
a matter of law or, failing that, a new trial or, failing
that, a rehearing on the question of probation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 12:35 AM. on the morning
of January 21, 1965, Appellant and Kenneth Dale
Hulse were apprehended in the shop restrooms of
Wheeler Machinery Company, in a crouched position,
six to ten feet apart, with a walkie-talkie and a pair
of brown work gloves about midway between them.
(R. 84-89, 109-lll, ll9, 121).

Two sledge hammers, a flashlight and a pinch
bar were discovered in the same building in the
office of the comptroller for the Wheeler Machinery
Company.

Plaster had been chipped from the wall

separating the comptroller's office from thewalk-in
vault leaving bricks exposed in the wall in a circular
area about ten inches in diameter. There was dust
and debris in the general area of the comptroller's
office. (R. 52, 85). In addition, the glass part of the
2

door separating the comptroller's office from the
outer accounting office was found to be broken.
(R.

51, 58).

The comptroller, Wren B. Egan, testified that
the tools and debris had not been there, nor had the
damage been done to the wall or the glass part of the
door, when he left the office at approximately 5:30
P.M. January 20, 1965. (R. 52-53). The custodian,

Werner P. Christensen, testified that the tools,
debris, dam age and broken window had not been there
when he last checked the office at approximately 10:15
P.M., January 20, 1965. (R. 77).

Neither the comptroller nor the custodian testified that the defendants were not authorized to be
in the Wheeler Machinery Building on the night in
question or that the partial demolition of the wall
was unauthorized except that the following evidence
was given by the comptroller on direct examination:
Q.

Did anyone have any permission to go
into your office after you left at approximately 5 P.M. on the 20th of January,
this year?

A.

The only one had permission would be
the janitor who checks and cleans my
office.

Q.

What is his name?
3

A.

Werner Christensen.

Q.

You gave permission to no one else; is
that correct?

A.

No, I did not. (R. 56).

Jack Merrick, a contract night watchman who
patrols the warehouse district, testified on direct
examination that at approximately 12:30 A.M., Jan"
uary 21, 1965, he entered the front door of the Wheel·
er Machinery Building, heard pounding, called the
police, circled around to the shop area and waited;
that three men came running out of the office area
into the shop area, that he yelled at them to stop.
and when they didn't, he fired one shot at them; that
two men ran into the shop restroom and that the third
man disappeared in the shop area between the ma·
chinery; that when the police came in the two de·
fendants were apprehended in the shop restroom.
(R.

80-88).

On cross examination, the witness Merrick
testified that he didn't actually see the men come
through the doorway into the shop area (R. 90); that
he fired the only shot at the men before the police
arrived (R. 99); that the two men entered the restroom
and that the police arrived about 30 seconds later.
(R. 100).

4

Police Officer Lynn J. Lund testified that
Merrick had let him into the shop area and that he
was present when Merrick fired the shot; that Merrick

did not yell at the men and tell them to stop. (R.115There is no direct evidence relating to the mode
of entry into the building. The only circumstantial
evidence adduced was Officer Edward Barton's testimony, admitted over defendants' objection, that he
had gained entrance by slipping the bolt of one of the
outside doors with the blade of his pocket knife.
(R. 126).

The only other evidence relating to the mode

of entry was the custodian's testimony that he checked
the doors iust prior to leaving at 10:30 P.M., January
20, 1965, rn. 77) and Officer Lund's testimony that

he had investigated to determine the mode of entry
and was unable to determine how entryhad been made.
(R.

121-123).
There was no direct evidence relating to the

time of entry into the building. Circumstantial evidence relating to the time of entry consists of the
custodian's statement that when he left the building
at approximately 10:30 P.M., January20, 1965, there
was no one, to his knowledge, in the area of the
Wheeler Machinery Company. (R. 78); the description
by the comptroller, custodian and night watchman of

5

the size (approximately the length of a football field
both ways. R. 62-63); character(several departments
with individual rooms separated by doors. R. 39- 47,
62, 65-68, 72-73); character of business conducted
inside the building (heavy equipment being repaired,
large parts, shelves and bins, etc. R 39-47,62,65·
68, 72-73), the fact that nothing was apparently
broken, damaged, or forced to gain entry; and the
amount of damage done to the wall separating the
comptroller's office from the vault.
There was no direct evidence relating to the
intent, if any, of the defendants at the time they gained
entrance to the building. The circumstantial evidence
consisted of testimony that there was some damage
done to the outer wall of the walk-in vault, although
it is not clear from the evidence whether or not there
were any valuables inside the vault at the time the
damage was done; that the defendants were present
in the building after business hours, although there is
no evidence that they were not authorized to be
present at that time; and that they ran when confronted
by Officer Merrick, although there is some evidence
that Officer Merrick opened fire on them without
warning.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendants
made a motion to dismiss the information for insuf6

ficiency of the evidence, which motion was denied,
and the defendants rested.
The jury was instructed and after deliberation,
returned verdicts of "guilty" against both defendants.
The defendant , Adonis Roger Burch, waived the
statutory time within which he must be sentenced and
requested that the court order a pre-sentence report
from the State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
On May 17, 1965, defendant, Adonis Roger Burch,
was sentenced to the Utah state Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law for the crime of
burglary in the second degree and his request for
probation was denied.
ARGUMENT

POINT L

THE INFORMATION IS INSUFFICIENT

TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah guarantees that an accused has the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, state vs. Topham, 41 Utah
39, 123 Pac. 888.

The information charges the Appellant with
7

burglary in the second degree in violation of Title
76, Chapter 9, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
as follows to-wit:
That on or about the 20th day of January
1965, at the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, the said ADONIS ROGER BURCH
entered the building of Wheeler Machine~y
Company, a corporation, in the night-time
with intent to commit larceny therem,
Section

73~9-3,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953

provides that a burglar is one
... who in the night-time forcibly breaks and
enters or without force enters an open door.
window, or other aperture of any,.. building
... w!J:h intent tocomm.!_tlarceny or anyfelon1
... L emphasis added_}
The information neither charges that defendan1
forcibly broke and entered the building of the Wheeler
Machinery Company nor does it charge that the de·
fendants, without force, entered through an open door.
window or other aperture of the building of Wheeler
Machinery Company.
Moreover, the information does not accuse the
defendants by using the name given to the offense by
the common law or by a statute as required by Section
77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, noris it couched
in thetermspermittedbySection 77-21-47, UtahCo~
Annotated, 1953.

The information fails to meet the

standard of notice required by constitutional or
8

statutory law to support the conviction.
POINT IL

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT

THE VERDICT THAT THE APPELLANT ISGUILTY

OF BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

The evidence upon which Appellant's conviction
is based is insufficient in that it fails to establish
( 1) the mode of entry, ( 2 ) the time of entry and ( 3)
the intent of the Appellant at the time of entry.
The common law definition of burglary required
a breaking and entering. 12C.J.S. 669, 673,Burglary
Sec. 3, 10. The Utah statute has expanded the definition of burglary to include, in addition to breaking
and entering, entry, without force, through an open
door, window or other aperture. 76-9-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. The Information upon whichAppel-

lant stands convicted charges only that the defendant
"entered" the building.
Defendant Burch's Demand for Bill of Particulars served on the district attorney requested answers to the following questions:
1. State whether it is contended by the pros-

ecution that the defendant, Adonis Roger
Burch, broke into the building of Wheeler
Machinery Company.

***
3. State whether it is contended by the pros9

ecution that said Adonis Boger Burch unlaw.
fully entered the building of Wheeler Machinery Company.
4. If the answer to the previous question is
yes, state when, where, and how. (R. 2)
To the foregoing questions, the district attorney
responded with a Supplemental Answer to Defendants'
Demand for Bill of Particulars which answered as
follows:
1. No. The state does not contend that the
defendant "broke" into the Wheeler Machinery Company in the sense that there was
any physical damage to the victim's property
caused by this defendant at the time of entry.
However, the state does contend that the defendant entered illegally.

3. Yes.

4. The specific entrance by which said de·
fendant unlawfully entered the building of
Wheeler Machinery is unknown to the State.
However, he unlawfully entered the building
at 330 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
sometime after sunset on January 20, 1965.
and prior to 12:40 A.M. on January 21,1965.
( R. 5 ).
The Defendant Hulse served a Demand for Bill
of Particulars upon the district attorney which de·
manded an answer to the following:

***
7.

By what means does the State contend
10

the defendants entered the Wheeler Machinery Company? ( R. 7 ).
To which the District Attorney answered:

***
7. The State will prove the defendants entered the building by unlawful means, but
the exact means used and the exact point
of entry is unknown to the State. ( R. 8).

The prosecution is required by law to plead
and prove that entry was gained by one of two
methods:
1. By forcibly breaking and enteringthe build-

ing; or
2.

Without force, by entering through an open

door, window, or other aperture.
The prosecution by the use of the particular
words contained in the Information, and by its answer
to paragraph 1 of defendant Burch's Demand for Bill
of Particulars, apparently based its case, and limited

its evidence, on the theory that the defendants entered
the building without force through an open door, window, or other aperture.
The evidence is totally void of any reference
as to which, how, or even that an open door, window,
or other aperture was entered and the prosecution
has admitted in its Bill of Particulars that it does
ll

not know the mode of entry.

( R. 5, 8 ). Mere

presence in the building is not sufficient. The mode
of entry must be established.

State ys. Tromim:,

123 Wash. 514, 232 Pac. 326; People vs. Burns, 114
C.A. (2d) 566, 250 P. (2d) 619; State ys. Sewell. 49
Wash. (2d) 244, 299 P. (2d) 570; State vs

Gruba~,

54 N.M. 272, 221 P. (2d)l055;Stateys Owen. 94Ariz.
354, 385 P. (2d) 227.

It has not been established.

It is required that the prosecution show by
affirmative proof that the entry was made duringthe
nighttime.
State vs.

76-9-3,
Miller.

Utah Code Annotated. 1953,

24 Utah 32, 67 Pac. 790.

Nighttime is defined as the period between
sunset and sunrise.

76-9-7, Utah Code Annotated,

1953.
The evidence neither establishes when the entry
was made, nor when nighttime began, that is when
the sun set.
There were two abortive attempts to stipulate,
and to get the court to take judicial notice as to
when the sun set on January 20, 1965. (R.69-70,
132, 133). Neither resulted in a stipulation or in the
establishment of the time by judicial notice, norwas
the jury instructed that there had been a stipulation
or judicial notice as to when the sun set. Moreover,
there was no competent admissible evidence regard·
12

ing what time the sun set on January 20, although
counsel for the other defendant did state in open
court that he was informed that the sun set at 5:31
p M. on January 20, 1965.

Such statement is not

competent evidence for the reason that it is based
on hearsay, and for the further reason that it was
not given under oath.
There was no direct evidence tending to show
when the building was entered.

The only circum-

stantial evidence adduced on the question was the
custodian's testimony that when he left at approximately 10:30 P.M. on January 20, 1965, there was
no one, to his knowledge, in the area of the Wheeler
Machinery Company. (R. 78).
When circumstantial evidence of this character
is considered, together with the fact that the rmd e
of entry is not shown, that the building is very large
in size, and presumably abounds in places where a
person can be present and undiscovered, the limited
scope of the custodian's activities, and the limited
opportunity of the custodian to know whether someone
else was present prior to his leaving (R. 77-78), it
can be readily seen that the evidence is as consistent
with entry in the daytime as in the nighttime. The
time of entry has not been established.
Under the Code and consistent with the plead13

ings, the prosecution is obliged to prove that at the
time of the entry, the defendant intended to commtl.
a larceny in the building.

notated, 1953.

76-9-3, Utah Code An-

State vs. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 27~

Pac. 950.
Again the prosecution has failed to adduce any
direct evidence as to intent at the time of entry. By
way of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution's
evidence showed that a hole had been started in the
wall of the vault, and that when the night watchma.1
accosted the suspects they ran.

The effect of this

latter bit of evidence is somewhat dulled by Officer
Lund's testimony that the nightwatchrnan fired atthe
defendants without warning. Further, it must be re·
membered that neither of the representatives o!

1

Wheeler Machinery Company, nor any of the othe' ,
witnesses, testified that the defendants were not
authorized to be in the building.

The prosecution

is required to show by direct, affirmative evidence
that the suspects did not have authority to be in the
building. 12 C.J.S. 734, Burglary, Sec. 57.
It is submitted that the effect of the circum·
stantial evidence relating to intent adduced by the
prosecution is further dulled by the prosecution's
inability to show the mode or time of entry. §!$ '
vs. Owen, 94 Ariz. 354, 385 P. (2d) 227.
14

POINT IIL THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS EDWARD BAR-

TON TO TESTIFY REGARDING HOW HE ENTERED
THE BUILDING.

Edward Barton, a detective on the Salt Lake
City Police Department was permitted to testify,

over Appellant's objection, that he had gained entrance to the building by slipping a bolt on one of the
doors with the blade of his pocket knife.

(R. 125,

126).

In effect, Detective Barton testified that hehad
conducted an experiment, out of court, to determine
how entry of the building had been accomplished.
Such testimony is inadmissible first, because
it does not relate to an issue before the court, and
second, because it is not shown that conditions were
the same.
The information does not charge the defendants
with breaking and entering the building of Wheeler
Machinery Company.

It merely alleges that defen-

dants unlawfully entered the building.

Moreover,

the prosecution, in its Bill of Particulars, apparently
disclaims any contention that there was a breaking
and entering, which there would have been had entry
been gained in the manner described by the witness.
Evidence of an experiment conducted out of
15

court is not admissible unless it is shown to be

1

relevant to an issue properly before the court. Jones

--..;.:

on Evidence, 2nd Edition, pp. 156, 515f, Sec.139, 410.

Even if the proferred evidence had been relevant
to one of the issues there is no showing that the de· '
fondants gained entry in the manner described or
through the door indicated or through any door or
that the conditions were the same. Evidence of an
experiment conducted out of court is not admissible
unless it is shown that conditions were the same.
Jones on Evidence, 2nd Edition, pp. 156, 515f, Secs.
139, 410.
To permit the jury to hear such testimony was
to suggest that the missing elements of the offense
had been proven, and in addition, reflected on appellant's character, all of which was, necessarily,

1

highly prejudicial to the defendant.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN TO THE JURY.
The court instructed the jury by instruction
No. 4-A:
You are instructed under the evidence
presented in this case, and the law per·
taining to this case, that Second Deg~ee
Burglary is the wtlawful, forcible breaking
and entering, or the unlawful entry thro~h
an open door, or window, without force, 10
16

1

the nighttime, with intent to commit larceny
therein.
"'Nighttime" means the period between
sunset and sunrise.
"Larceny" is
the felonious taking of
personal property of another.
"Felonious taking" means with intent
to permanently de,£rive the owner of possession thereof. L emphasis addedJ
and_by instruction No. 4-B:
Before you can convict a defendant of
Burglary in the Second Degree, you must
believe from the evidence, and be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, that each of the
following elements are true:
I1I that the defendant being considered
by you, on or about the 21st day of
January, 1965, in the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, unlawfully entered the building of Wheeler Machinery Company;
(2) that said entry, if any, was accomplished by forcibly breaking or entering, or by entering through an
open door, window or other aperture, or by opening a door or window;
(3) that the defendant being considered
by you at the time of said entry, if
any, intended to commit larceny in
sai.d building;

17

(4) t~at s.aid entry, if any, was in the
mghttime. (R.14) femphasis added]
Use of the word "unlawful" in two places of
the description of Second Degree Burglary as con·
tained in Instruction No. 4-A is error. Not only is
it meaningless, separate and apart from the other
aspects of the entry, and, therefore surplusage
but it tends to detract from the requirement that tht
jury find that there was a forcible breaking and en·
tering, or without force, an entry through an open
door, window or other aperture, and in so doing tends
to confuse the jury. Moreover, by following the er·
roneous form of the information, the use of the term
"unlawful entry" constitutes an indication by the
Court of inclination toward the prosecutor's case
and is prejudicial.

state vs. Harris, 1 U. (2d) 182,

264 P. (2d) 284; Mikell, Clark's Criminal Procedure,
2nd Edition, pp. 548f, Sec. 174-176. It necessarily
follows, therefore, that the use of term "unlawfully
entered" in subparagraph (1) of Instruction No. 4-B
is objectionable and prejudicial on the same ground.
By adding the phrase "or by opening a door or
window;" to the rest of subparagraph (2). the Court
not only restated a principle established in the same
sentence, but also, by using those particular words,
did so in a manner tantamount to a comment on the
18

9vidence,

and thereby committed grievous prejudi-

cial error.
(2d)

State vs. Green, 77 Utah 580, 590, 6 P.

177; State vs. Thompson, 110 Utahll3,170 P. (2d)

153, Mikell. Clark's Criminal Procedure, 2nd Edition,

p. 549, Sec. 174-176.

In addition, Appellant contends that the set of
instructions given by the court, where it does not
include instructions as to the included offenses of
Third Degree Burglary and Unlawful Entry with
Intent to Do Damage, Injure or Annoy, ignores the
defendants' theory of the case which theory is consistent with and supported by the evidence, and is
erroneous. State vs. Johnson, ll2 Utah 130, 185P. (2d)
738; People vs. Carmen (Cal.) 228 P. (2d) 281; Mikell,

Clark's Criminal Procedure, 2nd Edition, pp. 550f,
Sec. 174-176.
~reated

This contention will be more fully

under Point V.

POINT V.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO

GIVE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
Defendants requested that the court instruct the
jury as follows:
INSTRUCTION 1
You are instructed that the gravamen of
Second Burglarly in [Sic] the forceful
breaking and entering or without force the
entering of open doors, windows or other
19

aperature LsicJ of the establishment ai·
leged in the information.
Thus l-if_7 the State has failed toprovt
to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonablt
doubt that the defendants entered theestah .
lishment forcefully or without force enter~r
8:!! ope_!). door, window, or other aperature
l sic_/ of the establishment, you must find
the defendant not guilty. (R. 10).
INSTRUCTION 2
You are instructed that when in the
proseCJ:ttion for Burglarly in SecondDegree
sic_/ the question as to whethertheentf)
has been committed in the nighttime or 11
the daytime cannot be found beyond area.·
sonable doubt you are instructed that aver·
diet of third degree may be found provided
that you are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the other elements of the crime
of Burglarly l- sic_7 are proved by the State

L

1

(R.

11).

INSTRUCTION 3
You are instructed that the crime of un·
lawful entry with the intent to do damage is
an included offense of the crime of Second
Burglarly
sic_7. Before you can find th~
defendants guilty of the included off®S_e 0~
unlawful entry, you must find the l sic_,
each and every element as follows:

l

(1) That the defendants unlawfully
entered the building of Wheeler
Machinery Corp.

20

(2) That the defendants had at the
time of said entry the intent to do
damage.
( 3)

That the above acts occurred in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Before you can convict the defendants of
the crime of unlawful entry, you must find
to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the above. If the State has
failed to satisfy your minds beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendants
not guilty. (R. 12),
All three requested instructions were refused
by

the court

Defendants' requested instruction No. 1 describes, rn essentially the same words as those conUuned m Ser:tion 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
the acts sufficient to constitute a necessary element
of the offense, and as was seen under Point IV of the
ugu.men~

the trial court's instructions given under

4-A. and 4-B were inadequate in this regard.

The court's refusal to give requested instruci:ions numbered 2 and 3 is error. Both instructions
deal with the included offenses of Third Degree Burglary and Unlawful Entry. The defendants' strategy
was based upon the presumption of innocence and the
included offenses. People vs. Carmen,(Cal.) 228 P.
(2d) 281.

21

Section 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, Mi
provides in part:
.... When in a prosecution for burglary
the Second Degree the question as towheth'
the crime has been committed in the nigh;.
time or in the daytime cannot be definiM
arrived at by the jury, a verdict of guil~
of burglary in the third degree, as defined 1,
Section 76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated,!%!
may be found; provided the other elementi
of the crime of burglary inthethirddegn:e,
as defined in said Section 76-9-5, UtahCode
Annotated, 1953, have been proved.
Neither the time of entry nor the time the sun
set was established at the trial by director circurn·
stantial evidence.

The deficiency of the evidence

in this regard is more fully discussed under Point
II.

The defendants' theory of the case was that the

entry, if any, was made in the daytime, or at least
that the prosecution failed to prove that the entry wa1
made in the nighttime. The circumstantial evidence,
such as it is, bearing on the time of entry is as con·
sistent with the defendants' theory that the entry
was made in the daytime as that entry was made in
the nighttime. Defendants' requested instruction Ne.
2 almost word for word follows the provisions of

Section 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the
court should have granted it. State vs. Millg, 24
Utah 32, 67 Pac. 790;

Mikell, Clark's Crimi~
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Procedure, 2nd Edition, pp. 550f

Secs. 174-176.

Section 76-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides that:
Every person who unlawfully enters any
building or part of any building, room, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse,
or other building or any tent, vessel, watercraft, railroad car, automobile, automobile
trailer, aeroplane or aircraft with the intent
to damage property or to injure apersonor
annoy the peace and quiet of any occupant
therein is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The evidence adduced at the trial showed that a
glass part of an inside door had been broken and that
a part ofaninsidewallhadbeendamaged. There was
no evidenci:; that anything had been taken or stolen
from Wheeler Machinery Company. Indeed, the dis-

trict attorney in response to demand no. 4 contained
in

defendant Hulse' Demand for Bill of Particulars,

to-wit:

"was anything taken from the Wheeler Ma-

chrnery Company?

If so, itemize all said items.",

answered "No." (R. 7, 8).
Granted, the wall was the wall of a walk-in vault
but the prosecution's witness, Wren D. Egan, testified that entry to the vault could have been gained by
turning the dial and openingthedoorandthat with the
exception of the contents of a safe of unknown description contained in the vault, there was no evidence that
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the vault contained anything particularly valuable
(R. 41-42).

The foregoing consists of circumstantial evidence consistent with the proposition that entry haa
been gained with the intent to damage property rather
than with the intent to commit larceny inside the
building.

Defendants' strategy was based upon this

theory and there was substantial evidence tosuppol".
it. Defendants' requested instruction No. 3 shoull
have been given.
POINT VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO

GRANT PROBATION TO APPELLANT.
On the basis of the pre-sentence report pre·
pared by the Utah state Department of Adult Probation and Parole, which report defendant is not
permitted to see, the Court refused to grant pro·
bation to the Appellant.

While it is conceded that

the trial court has very broad discretion in the
question of whether or not to admit a particular
defendant to probation, that is not to say that the
court may take into account, in determining which
way to exercise that discretion, evidence from
witnesses without affording such defendant the right
to confront such witnesses.

It is possible that

Appellant could have explained such evidence to the
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satisfaction of the trial court and persuaded the
trial court to exercise its discretion to a contrary
result.
To withhold from Appellant the opportunity to
confront the witnesses and hear the evidence against
him and to have an opportunity to meet and rebut
such evidence is very prejudicial to Appellant and is
repugnant to Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah and to the 6th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of
America and is contrary to the standard of fair play
envisaged by the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United states of
America.

Article 1, Section 7, Constitution of the

State of Utah; 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.
CONCLUSION
The defect in the pleading, the insufficiency of
the evidence, and the error of the trial court in (1)
admitting the testimony of Edward Barton, (2) giving
rnstructions 4-A and 4-B to the jury, (3) failing to
instruct the jury with regard to included offenses,
and (4) refusing to give defendants' requested in8tructions all and individually warrant reversal of the lower court and thus setting aside, as a matter of law,
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the conviction of the Appellant.
The failure by the trial court to make the pre·
sentence report available to the defendant requires
that this court reverse the trial court's order deny·
ing probation and the remanding of the case fora
rehearing on that question.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES F. HOUSLEY
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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